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abstract:  A natural starting place for developing a phylogenetic species concept 
is to examine monophyletic groups of organisms.  Proponents of "the" 
Phylogenetic Species Concept fall into one of two camps.  The first camp denies 
that species even could be monophyletic and groups organisms using character 
traits.  The second groups organisms using common ancestry and requires that 
species must be monophyletic.  I argue that neither view is entirely correct.  While 
monophyletic groups of organisms exist, they should not be equated with species.  
Instead, species must meet the more restrictive criterion of being genealogically 
exclusive groups where the members are more closely related to each other than 
to anything outside the group.  I carefully spell out different versions of what this 
might mean and arrive at a working definition of exclusivity that forms groups 
that can function within phylogenetic theory.  I conclude by arguing that while a 
phylogenetic species concept must use exclusivity as a grouping criterion, a 
variety of ranking criteria are consistent with the requirement that species can be 
placed on phylogenetic trees. 
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1.  Introduction 
 The species problem – how to sort organisms into various species – 
remains a central problem in biological taxonomy.  Despite many bitter 
disagreements about these fundamental units, there is widespread agreement on 
how to delimit "higher" taxa (those that are more inclusive than species).  
Systematics today is dominated by the phylogenetic perspective – the view that 
evolutionary history is of primary importance when delimiting taxa.  From this 
standpoint, only monophyletic groups, which consist of an ancestor and all of its 
descendants, are taxa.   
 Phylogenetic systematics, or simply "phylogenetics", studies the diversity 
of life by considering the evolutionary history of various groups.  It has been 
widely argued that a variety of species concepts in the literature recognize as 
species certain groups of organisms that are inappropriate for phylogenetic 
analysis (Rosen 1978, Eldredge and Cracraft 1980, Wiley 1981).  For example, 
grouping organisms by their ability to interbreed, as the Biological Species 
Concept does, or by their shared ecological properties, as the Ecological Species 
Concept does, leads to groups that cannot be the tips of phylogenetic trees 
(Velasco 2008).  If a group can be (properly) placed on a phylogenetic tree then 
the group in question can be subjected to phylogenetic analysis because it has a 
unique evolutionary history of the right sort.  This unique history is what 
biological and ecological (and many other) "species" may lack. 
  Many authors have argued that while phylogenetics is an important 
biological project, other projects are important as well and can lead to different, 
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but equally valid, ways of grouping organisms into species (Kitcher 1984, 
Ereshefsky 1992, Dupré 1993, Stanford 1995, LaPorte 2005).  Authors with this 
view have defended a variety of forms of pluralism about species.  Opposed to 
pluralism is monism which says that we need a single species concept so that the 
species taxa used for scientific communication throughout biology have one 
consistent meaning. 
 Among monists, a common viewpoint is that since phylogenetics is an 
overriding concern in taxonomy, any species concept which is inconsistent with 
phylogenetics is unacceptable.  For the purposes of this paper, I adopt this 
phylogenetic perspective without argument.  My question here is not whether we 
need a species concept that fits well within phylogenetics, but rather, what must 
such a phylogenetic species concept look like.  My answer is that acceptable 
versions of a phylogenetic species concept must group organisms into 
genealogically exclusive groups.  Roughly, these groups are such that each 
organism in the group is more closely related to any others in the group than to 
any organisms outside the group.  Any concept that requires species to be 
exclusive groups, and only these concepts, can be properly called "phylogenetic" 
species concepts. 
 The paper proceeds as though we are aiming to develop the single best 
species concept.  If it turns out that pluralism is in fact the best view, no such 
concept exists; however, the following discussion is still important because even 
then we will still need to know what the best species concept is for the purposes 
of phylogenetics.  Determining necessary conditions for serving as tips of 
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phylogenetic trees is an important project independently of whether monism or 
pluralism is true. 
 
2. Phylogenetic Species Concepts in the literature 
 Phylogenetics examines the genealogical relationships among 
monophyletic groups in order to better understand their evolution through time. 
Serious problems arise when we attempt to investigate the history of non-
monophyletic groups using phylogenetic trees (Hennig 1966) and related 
problems occur with many species concepts (Velasco 2008). Therefore, we need a 
species concept that delimits groups based on common genealogical history if we 
are to form groups that fit into contemporary phylogenetic theory.   
 Authors who take such a genealogical perspective tend to develop some 
version of what they call a “Phylogenetic Species Concept” (PSC).  Cracraft 
(1983) was perhaps the first to use this term.  His version of the concept groups 
species by unique patterns of shared characters.  Rosen (1978), Eldredge & 
Cracraft (1980) and Nixon & Wheeler (1990) each presented versions of the same 
basic idea. A more recent explication of this concept defines species as “the 
smallest aggregation of (sexual) populations or (asexual) lineages diagnosable by 
a unique combination of character states” (Wheeler and Platnick 2000: 58).  This 
“diagnostic criterion” is not based only on evolutionary history, but rather, is 
based on character traits (genetic or phenotypic) and so can lead to non-
monophyletic groups forming species (Baum 1992, Baum and Donoghue, 1995).  
Thus, despite its name, this concept does not fit with phylogenetic theory.   
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 A different strain of phylogenetic species concepts has been produced 
with the explicit hope of co-opting the PSC name.  Mishler & Donoghue (1982), 
Donoghue (1985), Mishler (1985), Mishler & Brandon (1987), and Mishler and 
Theriot (2000), each present versions of a PSC that allows only monophyletic 
groups to be species.  These versions can often lead to different groupings than 
the “diagnostic” version of the PSC.  For example, Mishler and Theriot (2000: 46, 
47), takes its cue from Mishler and Brandon (1987) and says, 
 A species is the least inclusive taxon recognized in a formal phylogenetic 
 classification.  As with all hierarchical levels of taxa in such a 
 classification, organisms are grouped into species because of evidence of 
 monophyly.   
 
They follow this with an odd description of how they are understanding 
monophyly, but this is not relevant here.  What is important is that the definition 
of species (and all taxa) given by Mishler, Brandon, and Theriot explicitly builds 
in epistemological factors.  On this picture, groups are not taxa because they are 
monophyletic; rather, they are taxa because there is strong evidence that they are 
monophyletic.  The same considerations apply to species.  Here, it seems that the 
authors are concerned about why we decide to name certain groups as species – 
but naming a group as a species doesn't make it so.  Unlike many forms of 
biological classification, a core idea in phylogenetics is that we do not create taxa, 
we discover them.  These taxa are the products of the evolutionary process and 
exist independently of whether we ever correctly identify them or name them.  
The same considerations apply to species – when we name a group of organisms 
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as a species, we are simply making a hypothesis that this group is in fact a 
species.  It is possible that we are simply mistaken.   
 As we saw earlier, characters serve as evidence that a group is a taxon; 
they do not determine that it is a taxon.  This is merely an instance of the general 
fact that taxa are not determined by any epistemological factors, but rather by 
objective, mind-independent facts about genealogical relationships.  Given what 
Mishler and Theriot say elsewhere, it is clear that they do not intend their 
definition to rely on epistemological factors, and making this clear in the 
definition requires only a small wording change, but this change represents an 
important shift in the way that we view taxa and is therefore worth emphasizing.   
 Roughly speaking, we can think of these history-based versions of the 
PSC as requiring that species be monophyletic groups and then adding something 
about a ranking criterion.  Because other kinds of taxa are monophyletic, we need 
a criterion to determine which monophyletic groups are species (as opposed to 
subspecies or genera etc.).  These versions of the PSC (perhaps slightly tweaked) 
can be justified as follows: phylogenetic systematics requires that taxa be 
monophyletic; species are taxa; so species must be monophyletic.   
 Systematists tend to have one of two types of opinions about the above 
argument.  The first type of response relies on the claim that species are 
fundamentally different kinds of entities than higher taxa.  Higher taxa must be 
monophyletic, but because species play a different role in evolutionary theory 
than do other taxa, they are not (necessarily) monophyletic.  Typically, these 
authors think that not only are species not required to be monophyletic, but that 
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they couldn't be.  It is a kind of category mistake to claim that they could be.  
The second response, which isn't critical, relies on thinking that species are not 
fundamentally different and so takes accepts the argument above at face value.   
 Neither of these views is entirely correct.  It is a mistake to think that 
species are fundamentally different types of entities than higher taxa.  When we 
are working within the confines of phylogenetic theory, species, like other taxa, 
must be genealogical units with certain properties.  However, it is also incorrect to 
assume that there is a straightforward argument starting with higher taxa as 
monophyletic groups of species and transitioning to species being monophyletic 
groups of organisms.  The relevant concepts can apply – but we will be grouping 
organisms incorrectly into species if we blindly apply the same principles in the 
case of species as are traditionally applied to higher taxa.  We need to group 
organisms genealogically, but this is not simple.  As it turns out, many 
monophyletic groups of organisms are not basic phylogenetic units.  To see why 
this is the case, I will now discuss the two responses to the above argument in 
more detail. 
 
3. The argument that species can't be monophyletic 
 The arguments from systematists who think that species cannot be 
monophyletic ultimately fail, but they nonetheless point us in the right direction 
for thinking about why it is none-trivial to apply the concept of monophyly to 
phylogenetic species.  One common reason given for why species shouldn't be 
required to be monophyletic is that by definition, it is actually impossible for them 
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to be so.  After all, "A monophyletic group is a group of species descended from 
a single ('stem') species, and which includes all species descended from this stem 
species" (Hennig 1966:73).  The idea is that terms like "monophyletic" and 
"paraphyletic" apply only to groups of "atoms" (the species) and not to the atoms 
themselves (Wiley 1981, Nixon & Wheeler 1990).   
 However, even if we insist on this definition of monophyly, it is clear 
from context that this way of phrasing the objection to the requirement that 
species be monophyletic is merely semantic.  The relevant question is whether we 
are required to group all of the descendants of some common ancestor together 
when we delimit taxa of any size or whether there can be exceptions at the species 
level.  This is a question that all systematists must face regardless of how they 
wish to use the terms "monophyly" and "paraphyly" (de Queiroz and Donoghue 
1990).  For the purposes of clarity, I will continue to use the broader 
understanding of monophyly which allows that there are monophyletic groups of 
organisms and ask whether or not species should be required to be monophyletic. 
 Similarly, a second strain of "anti-species monophyly" claims that species 
can't be monophyletic because biparental organisms form reticulating (non-
nested) patterns of genealogical relationship and the same holds of character 
distributions within such groups.  Within such groups we find tokogeny, ancestor-
descendant relations, rather than phylogeny, sister-group relations (Hennig 1966, 
Meier and Willman 2000).  Again, this is merely a semantic issue.  Monophyletic 
groups of organisms still exist even if we deny that they can have internal 
phylogenetic relationships.   
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 What is underlying the distinction between species and higher taxa in 
many of these cases is not merely insistence on specific word usage, but rather, 
issues about epistemology.  For example, de Queiroz and Donoghue deny that 
species can be monophyletic because “Phylogenetic methods break down in this 
case [the non-nested case] because an assumption underlying the principle that 
shared, derived characters provide evidence of phylogenetic relationship (i.e. of 
monophyly) is violated" (de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988: 325). 
 Nelson (1979) and Wheeler and Platnick (2000) discuss the failure of 
"cladistic methods" – by which they mean Parsimony – in such cases.  Parsimony 
uses synapomorphies (shared derived traits) to judge relationships and assumes a 
tree-like branching structure.  Many of these authors rely on the idea that the 
phylogeny is nothing but the results of applying a particular method to summarize 
character data.  This is yet another instance of mistaking epistemology for 
metaphysics.  Which organisms form genealogical groups and where these groups 
fit on the Tree of Life are objective facts that are metaphysically prior to any facts 
about how we might infer such relationships.  A truly phylogenetic species 
concept relies on just these objective facts.   
 
4. The real problem with non-nested groups 
 Although the fact that non-nested genealogical relationships might require 
different methods of inference than nested relationships require is no reason to 
doubt that concepts such as monophyly apply to groups of organisms, the issues 
raised above might be the beginnings of a more serious argument about why 
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monophyletic groups of organisms may be unsuitable as species or as taxa 
more generally. 
 Part of what makes monophyletic groups so important in systematics is 
that they often form exclusive groups: groups in which all members in the group 
are more closely related to each other than to anything outside the group.  
Contemporary mammals form an exclusive group since any mammal is more 
closely related to any other mammal than to any non-mammal.  In a purely 
diverging genealogy1, exclusive groups are formed by any time-slice of any 
monophyletic group as in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. A monophyletic group is composed of an ancestor and all of its
descendants.  A paraphyletic group includes only some of those descendants.  
An exclusive group is a contemporaneous group of organisms more closely 
related to each other than to anything outside the group.  Figure from Velasco 
(2008) – used with permission of Elsevier.  
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Here the concepts fit together nicely.  In fact, Hennig (1966) assumed that 
monophyletic groups simply were exclusive groups and used the word 
"monophyletic" to refer to both properties.  Immediately after defining 
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monophyletic as a stem species plus all its descendants, he says "Another 
definition is: A monophyletic group is a group of species in which every species 
is more closely related to every other species than to any species that is classified 
outside the group" (Hennig 1966:73).  It wasn't until de Queiroz and Donoghue 
(1990) that they were properly separated and the term "exclusivity" was invented 
and distinguished from monophyly.  In addition, as with monophyly, the concept 
was extended to apply to groups of organisms generally and not just species (and 
the reliance on classification was removed to make it purely about genealogy).  
This "alternative definition" of monophyly partly explains why there is such 
confusion over whether there could be monophyletic groups of organisms.  Such 
groups could strictly fit a more inclusive version of one of the definitions of 
monophyly, but they don't have all of the properties that monophyletic groups are 
supposed to have because they don't fit the other definition – i.e., they are not 
necessarily exclusive groups. 
 Once we distinguish monophyly from exclusivity, the conceptual issues 
become much easier to deal with.  When we look at the appropriate level, the 
genealogies of organisms are not purely diverging.  Many organisms have two 
parents, meaning that their genealogies will be reticulate.  There will therefore be 
a separation between those groups that are monophyletic and those that are 
exclusive.  The problem was there before with higher taxa (for example, when 
taxa are formed by hybridization), but it was typically ignored as being rare or 
unimportant to the general, overall pattern.  But looking at groups of organisms 
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directly brings the relevant issue to light in a way that makes it more easily 
appreciable.   
 A purely diverging phylogeny forms a tree – branches split off from each 
other but never merge.  This will be the case if species always have exactly one 
immediate ancestor.  In this respect, uniparental organisms form a genealogical 
tree in exactly the same way that taxa do.  However, biparental organisms do not 
form a tree.  This means that monophyletic groups will overlap and therefore will 
not form exclusive groups.  For example, I am part of one monophyletic group 
stemming from my paternal grandfather consisting of him and all of his 
descendants.  I am also part of another monophyletic group consisting of my 
maternal grandfather and all of his descendents.  These groups overlap (my two 
sisters and I are part of both) and neither group is exclusive.  We can see this by 
examining Figure 2, which depicts part of a rather ordinary human family tree.   
ALICE BARBARA
ROBERT SCOTTRANDY RHONDAJAMES
Figure 2. Two monophyletic groups of organisms which overlap.  Each consists of 
one grandparent, her children, and their children.  No subgroup of organisms in the 
entire picture is exclusive (following the definition given in section 5).
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In this figure above, the two enclosed groups each represent monophyletic 
groups, but the organisms within each monophyletic group at the bottom (in the 
same generation) do not form exclusive groups.  For example, James and Robert 
are first cousins since they share a grandparent.  But Robert is also a cousin to 
Scott who is outside the left hand group.   
 Monophyletic groups of organisms are still interesting groups even if they 
overlap and are not exclusive– for example, if we are interested in tracking the 
history of some genetic trait, we may want to know all of the descendants of some 
particular person.  A common example is tracking the recessive gene for 
hemophilia in the European royal families which requires us to have a pedigree 
containing at least Queen Victoria and all of her descendants.  Not all of her 
descendants carry the relevant gene, but this would be the group to examine if you 
were interested in tracking it.  The fact that this group overlaps with other 
monophyletic groups is irrelevant.   
 While biologically interesting groups can of course overlap, taxa cannot.  
Each organism is a member of at most one species and that species has a specific 
place in the nested taxonomic hierarchy.  The idea of a single, unique taxonomy 
of life is the tradition within systematics and is enforced within various 
nomenclature codes such as the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature 
(McNeill et al. 2006).  While it may be permissible to buck tradition and to 
violate various nomenclature codes, there is an additional problem with 
overlapping taxa.  By allowing overlapping taxa, we will no longer be able to use 
species as the tips of phylogenetic trees, which is to deny our working premise 
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that we are searching for a phylogenetic species concept.  Again, even if we 
accept some version of pluralism which allows that species can overlap with each 
other, we would still need to know which groups can serve as "taxa" in the sense 
of being the tips of phylogenetic trees.  These taxa cannot overlap.  Since 
monophyletic groups do overlap, we can’t simply allow all monophyletic groups 
to be taxa.  However, exclusive groups do form a strict nested hierarchy and 
cannot overlap.   
 The fact that exclusive groups do not overlap is not simply due to wishful 
thinking but is a conceptual truth.  To be clear, by non-overlap, I mean that if an 
organism is part of two exclusive groups X and Y, either X is completely 
contained in Y or Y is completely contained in X.  Imagine two exclusive groups 
did overlap.  Then there would be three organisms a, b, and c where a is in X, but 
not Y, b is in X and Y, and c is in Y but not X.  Now since X is exclusive, b has to 
be closer to a (which is in X) than to c (not in X).  Since Y is exclusive, b has to 
be closer to c (which is in Y) than to a (not in Y).  This is contradictory, so there 
can be no such overlap.  Notice that this has nothing to do with X or Y being 
basal groups so higher taxa exhibit the same non-overlap property and therefore 
exclusive groups form a strict hierarchy which is a very desirable, if not 
necessary, condition on a definition of taxa.   
 Exclusive groups form a strict nested hierarchy and they are defined only 
in terms of genealogical history.  Monophyletic groups meet the second condition, 
but not the first.  We need shift the discussion of phylogenetic species from 
monophyletic groups to exclusive groups. 
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5. From monophyly to exclusivity 
 Before we can safely define taxa as exclusive groups, we need to examine 
the properties of exclusive groups.  To do this, we need a better understanding of 
what such groups look like in reticulating networks.  While it seems as though I 
have already defined exclusivity – “each member is more closely related to 
anything else in the group than to anything outside it” – Hennig was thinking of 
groups of species in strictly diverging trees and it is not at all clear exactly how to 
think more generally of exclusive groups of organisms.   
For example, on a natural understanding of “more closely related”, an 
organism is at least as closely related to one of its parents as to any other 
organism.  But this would require that any exclusive group that contains me must 
also have my father and therefore all of his children.  Since my father is in the 
group, so is his father and therefore all of my grandfather’s children and of course 
their children as well, etc.  Parallel reasoning leads to all of life forming one big 
exclusive group with no exclusive groups inside it.  To avoid this consequence, 
we talk only about contemporaneous groups or relatively contemporaneous 
groups – perhaps we can include all living humans – but the point is that some 
ancestors must be excluded from the relevant comparison classes.  This is what 
Baum and Shaw (1995) define as a “time-limited” rather than a “time-extended” 
approach to taxa.  Baum (1998) describes how we could start with the time-
limited approach to taxa and attempt to construct time-extended entities out of 
them.  But as Baum points out, under almost any definition of species, we will 
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need to be able to delimit a time-limited species in order to construct a time-
extended species out of it, so there is nothing particularly surprising or 
undesirable about being forced into a time-limited approach.  It is likely that 
Mishler and Brandon (1987) anticipated this issue without making the distinction 
between monophyletic and exclusive groups which is why they defined 
monophyly in a synchronic (or time-limited) way.   
 Incidentally, the time-limited approach to classification presents us with 
part of the solution to an apparent problem with phylogenetic species which we 
failed to deal with in section three.  As Sober (2000: 166) points out, one species 
cannot be ancestral to another if that ancestral species were required to be 
monophyletic.  Following Hennig (1966: 72), many systematists argue that 
classification is done from the standpoint of a particular "time horizon", but it isn't 
clear that this allows ancestral organisms to be a part of any species at all if all 
species are required to be monophyletic.  On the time-limited view, the "ancestral 
species" can be exclusive (though not monophyletic) since it is being compared to 
its contemporaries and not its descendents.   
 Getting back to defining exclusivity, how do we measure how closely 
organisms are related to each other?  An obvious way to do it is to measure their 
recency of common ancestry.  A is more closely related to B than to C if the most 
recent common ancestor (MRCA) of A and B (or 'an' MRCA as there could be 
more than one) is more recent than an MRCA of A and C.2  This definition is 
applicable in both reticulating and diverging cases.  However, we do have to be a 
bit more careful here since in a reticulating network, certain symmetries disappear 
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– for example, unlike on a divergent tree, just because A is closer to B than to 
C is does not follow that B is closer to A than to C.  For example, in the earlier 
Figure 2, while James is closer to Robert than to Scott, it is not true that Robert is 
closer to James than to Scott.  As we will see, this asymmetry will prove the key 
to understand which properties of exclusivity are essential to being phylogenetic 
units. 
 The question now is how to extend this to some arbitrary group of 
organisms, A, contained within some reference group X (think of all 
contemporaneous organisms as the group X for the 'standard' example).  There are 
a number of possibilities.  One straightforward extension relies on pair-wise 
comparisons.  For some subgroup A of X to be exclusive (relative to the rest of X) 
is for any organism in A to be more closely related to any other organism in A 
than to any organism in X that is not in A.  In this case, the relevant common 
ancestor of each pair might be different.  For reasons that will become clear later, 
we often need to focus on groups that can be defined by talking about an MRCA 
of the entire group.  A natural way to use exclusivity here would be to define an 
exclusive group as a group A in X such that B, an MRCA of every member of A, 
lived more recently than an MRCA of anyone in group A with anyone in X but 
not in A. 
 Both of these explications of exclusivity fail for the same reason: the 
group of organisms may not be a single, genealogical unit.  Organisms inside the 
group (or ancestral organisms like an MRCA of the group) cannot represent the 
whole group on a phylogenetic tree.  Organisms in different groups could still be 
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connected to each other through lines of descent other than through this 
MRCA.  This means that although group A would be exclusive, some organisms 
outside A could be closer to some organisms in A than to others.  This is 
undesirable for a variety of reasons (Velasco 2008).  As pointed out before, this 
possibility is due to the non-symmetry of 'more closely related than' in reticulating 
networks.  Although group A would fit the definition of exclusivity, it doesn’t 
have all of the nice properties typically ascribed to exclusive groups (which we 
can now see should have been ascribed only to exclusive groups in a purely 
diverging phylogeny).  A true genealogical unit should be such that it is 
“collapsible” and can be treated like a single point with respect to every other part 
of the Tree of Life: one organism in a group should represent the whole group (for 
purposes of taxonomy).  To secure this, we want any contemporaneous organism 
outside a taxon to be equally closely related to everything inside that taxon.  I will 
call this the unity condition. 
 This is one of the central reasons that monophyly is so important among 
the higher taxa.  A time-slice of a paraphyletic group will always fail to meet the 
unity condition.  It makes no sense to ask how closely related birds are to reptiles 
– it depends on which reptile you pick.  This is not the case with mammals – with 
respect to birds, any mammal group is interchangeable.   
 Without this condition, intuitive consequences of genealogical relatedness 
claims will fail.  Above the species level, when we say that birds and crocodiles 
are more closely related to each other than either is to snakes, we want this to 
imply that any particular species of bird will be closer to any crocodile species 
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than to any species of snake.  Similarly, below the species level, when we say 
that humans are closer to chimps than to gorillas, this should imply that any 
particular human is closer to any chimp than to any gorilla.  If species do not meet 
the unity condition, this implication fails.  If we want taxa to have a unique 
position on the Tree of Life and we want to be able to speak of the genealogy of a 
taxa or the phylogeny of a group of taxa, then taxa must meet the unity condition.  
We must understand exclusivity in a way that guarantees this. 
 In order to ensure that exclusive groups meet the unity condition, we must 
require that the MRCA of the group must be a part of any genealogical line 
leading to the exclusive group in question.   One way to do this is to demand that 
the MRCA of the group be a “bottleneck” organism such that any ancestral line 
that reaches anything in A must go through this organism.  But this is far too 
restrictive.  Exclusive groups of this type would rarely form in sexually 
reproducing lineages.  But we can ensure the unity condition without resorting to 
bottlenecks by simply requiring that there be some path through the MRCA.  We 
can do this as follows: "An exclusive group of organisms A is a subgroup taken 
from a larger contemporaneous group X such that there is some organism B 
where B is an ancestor of every organism in A and B is a descendent of any 
common ancestor of any member of A and any member of X not in A.”  
 Notice that there is no need to require that the relevant organism B 
actually be the MRCA of all of the organisms in A.  We still get the unity 
condition and everything else we want if there is some other common ancestor 
slightly further back in time that meets the other definitional criteria.  It is also 
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important to see that since B is an ancestor of every organism in A, A must 
include every contemporaneous descendant of B (any descendent of A would be 
equally closely related).  So in addition to being exclusive, these groups are 
timeslices of monophyletic groups of organisms.  But importantly, not all 
timeslices of monophyletic groups are exclusive so a synchronic understanding of 
monophyly is simply not what we were after all along.   
 As an example, let’s describe what it means for extant humans to be an 
exclusive group.  Let’s call contemporaneous organisms the set of all organisms 
alive today.  For the living humans to form an exclusive group there must be some 
organism B such that B is an ancestor of all living humans and is a descendent of 
any common ancestor of any human and a non-human.  Any chimp and any 
human share very many ancestors in common, the most recent of which probably 
lived around 6 million years ago.  If there is an organism B that is a descendant of 
each of these ancestors, then all humans are more closely related to each other 
than to any non-human, and any non-human is equally related to every human.    
This would mean that the unity condition applies to humans, showing that humans 
are an exclusive group. 
 We have good reason to believe that humans are an exclusive group under 
just such a definition.  For example, Mitochondrial Eve, estimated to have lived 
about 140,000 years ago, (Dawkins 2004) is a matrilineal ancestor of every living 
human (trace back mother to mother to mother, etc. and you will hit 
Mitochondrial Eve).  Likewise, Y-chromosome Adam, the patrilineal ancestor of 
every human, is estimated to have lived about 60,000 years ago.  Either one, or 
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many other ancestral organisms, could serve as "organism B" in our definition.  
Incidentally, the MRCA of all living humans (through mixed male and female 
lines) is estimated to have lived much more recently – estimates vary from 8,000 
to as little as 2,000 years ago (Chang 1999; Rohde et al. 2004; Rohde ms).  This 
seems remarkably recent, but in fact compared to other comparable groups of 
organisms, it is relatively distant due to the geographical separation of large 
groups of humans from each other.  In a randomly mating population of N 
individuals, the predicted time to the MRCA is heavily concentrated around log2N 
generations (Chang 1999).  So, if humans were randomly mating, the population 
of 6,000,000,000 contemporaneous humans would be expected to have a MRCA 
who lived approximately 32 generations ago, which is less than 1000 years ago.  
It is not difficult for exclusive groups of this type to form given a reasonable 
amount of time isolated from outside groups.  
 While it may seem that we have an overly complicated definition of an 
exclusive group, it turns out to be easy for such relations to arise.  Two isolated 
lineages are virtually certain to form exclusive groups in a biologically reasonable 
amount of time (log2N generations for a randomly mating population, longer if 
there is strong assortative mating or geographic structure).  Exclusive groups of 
organisms certainly seem to be genealogical units of an interesting sort.  Their 
genealogical connections with each other are grounded in the genealogical 
connections of organisms.  Since they are time-slices of monophyletic groups they 
can function in historical explanations of trait distribution and since they possess 
the unity condition they can be placed at the tips of phylogenetic trees in order to 
  
22
allow history-based inferences in evolutionary biology.  In short, exclusive 
groups fulfill all of the desiderata of the units in phylogenetic systematics and so 
exclusive groups of organisms can and should be equated with taxa.  These taxa 
have the property of being located at a precise place on the Tree of Life.  Though 
there is still room for debate about precisely how to construct time-extended 
entities out of these time-limited entities (Baum 1998), and whether we even want 
to do this (Baum forthcoming) these exclusive groups of organisms have the 
properties that we need for the building blocks of taxonomy.  Whatever else we 
want to require of species, they must be exclusive groups of organisms. 
 
6. Species as a Rank 
 What I have argued so far is that a phylogenetic species concept must 
group using exclusivity.  But which exclusive groups should be species?  This is a 
ranking question, separate from the grouping questions addressed so far.  For our 
purposes, it is unnecessary to answer this question. What makes a species concept 
acceptable as "phylogenetic" is that species be able to serve at the tips of 
phylogenetic trees.  This condition can be met with nearly any ranking criterion.  
Phylogenetics in general is consistent with a variety of views about the higher 
ranks such as order, family, and genus.  It should come as no surprise that 
phylogenetic thinking about species shares this same quality.  For example, 
Mishler and Brandon (1987) have a pluralistic view: different taxa are ranked as 
species for different reasons.  Baum (forthcoming) agrees that a variety of ranking 
criteria can be used; however, he argues that it is "semi-arbitrary" which exclusive 
  
23
groups are species.  This is a conventional matter to be decided by us.  Mishler 
(1999) argues that we should get rid of the species rank all together.  For Mishler, 
what is important is whether or not a group is a taxon.  The "least-inclusive 
taxonomic unit" idea of Pleijel and Rouse (2000) is similar in spirit and content.  
These "anti-species" views are consistent with the above discussion, but do not 
follow by necessity.  The species rank can be objective, semi-arbitrary, or even 
useless, but in each case, we could still talk of phylogenetic species as 
phylogenetic units.  The debate about species ranking should be seen as 
incidental.  Many species concepts, differentiated by their ranking criteria – or 
their view of the status of the species rank itself – have a right to be called 
"phylogenetic" species concepts.  What unites them all is that they group 
organisms into exclusive groups.   
 
Endnotes 
1.  By a 'diverging' phylogeny I mean that branches split but never join.  
Equivalently, each node (other than the root) has precisely one parent.  It is 
tempting to think that a diverging phylogeny means that the horizontal distance 
between tips represents phenotypic divergence as well but this is not correct.  For 
example, instances of convergent evolution take place on a diverging tree. 
2. Baum and Shaw (1995) anticipate much of the above discussion and conclude 
that taxa should be exclusive groups, but deny that exclusivity can be understood 
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in MRCA terms.  They do this because they wish to define species as basal taxa 
and some exclusive groups would be too small to be species.  However, here, I do 
not assume that species are the smallest exclusive groups; rather, I am searching 
for a general phylogenetic grouping criterion and a general understanding of 
exclusive groups of organisms. 
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